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Speeding has been a great concern around the world due to the occurrence and severity of road 
crashes. This paper presents an evaluation of the effectiveness of different penalty and camera-
based enforcement strategies in curbing speeding offences by professional drivers in Hong 
Kong. A stated preference survey approach is employed to measure the association between 
penalty and enforcement strategies and drivers’ speed choices. Data suggest that almost all 
drivers comply with speed limits when they reach a camera housing section of the road. For 
other road sections, a panel mixed logit model is estimated and applied to understand the 
effectiveness of penalties and enforcement strategies on driver’s speeding behaviors. Driving-
offence points (DOPs) are found to be more effective than monetary fines in deterring speeding 
offences, albeit there is significant heterogeneity in how drivers respond to these strategies. 
Warning drivers of an upcoming camera-based enforcement section increased speed 
compliance. Several demographic and employment characteristics, driving history and 
perception variables also influence drivers’ choices of speed compliance. Finally, besides 
penalty and enforcement strategies, driver education and training programs aimed at addressing 
aggressiveness/risk-taking traits might help reduce repeated speeding offences among drivers. 
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Hong Kong is a city with high population density and limited road space. The ability of public 
transport to serve high density cities well, as well as the relatively high costs of private vehicle 
ownership and high operational costs (especially parking costs) resulting from the limited road 
space, has resulted, in Hong Kong, in the dominance of public transport as the primary mode 
for work-related as well as non-work travel. Of particular note is the relatively seamless 
integration of road-based and rail-based metro public transportation services in Hong Kong, 
with transfers between the two broad modes of public transportation commonplace. Overall, 
over 90% of commute trips as well as over 46 % of non-commute trips in the territory are 
undertaken by road-based and/or rail-based public transport (Transport and Housing Bureau, 
2017; Transport Department, 2014).  
The road-based public transportation modes (PTMs) in Hong Kong primarily include a 
regular bus mode (operated either publicly or privately), a light bus mode (or mini-bus mode 
that typically carries up to 19 passengers, again operated publicly or privately), and taxis (while 
the taxi mode may not be traditionally viewed as a public transportation mode, it is not 
uncommon in Hong Kong for the use of taxis to access bus stations and rail stations, making it 
an integral component of public transportation use in the country). The substantial dependence 
on PTMs contribute to, on a per capita basis, a low vehicle miles of travel (VMT) in Hong Kong. 
This low exposure, along with low speeds (due to high vehicle densities) and the protective 
cushion offered by large buses, has resulted in a relatively low number of crashes in Hong Kong, 
especially those resulting in serious injuries/death. In particular, there were 108 fatalities and 
2214 individuals seriously injured in road traffic crashes in 2017 (Transport Department, 2017). 
Based on a population estimate of about 7.4 million in Hong Kong in 2017, this translates to a 
per capita fatality rate of 14.6 deaths per million population (relative to, for example, 28 road 
traffic fatalities per million population in the UK and 107 deaths per million population in the 
US).  
Clearly, Hong Kong’s traffic safety record, at least on a per capita basis, is superior 
relative to many other western nations. However, an issue of concern in Hong Kong is that, 
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unlike many western countries, a vast majority of the vehicles being driven on the roads are by 
professional drivers (interestingly, ride-hailing services have yet to be legalized in Hong Kong, 
and, as indicated earlier, taxi rides are a common way to access PTMs, in addition to walking; 
and taxi drivers are carefully regulated in terms of licensing requirements). Thus, it is of concern 
in Hong Kong that the crash involvement rate of public transport vehicles is seven times higher 
than that of the private car (Transport Department, 2017). It certainly brings into spotlight the 
safety performance of professional drivers and the licensing regulations in place for such drivers. 
While professional driver-related crashes and the organization/travel culture has been examined 
at some length in the west and the middle-east (for example, see Mallia et al., 2015; Newnam 
et al., 2018; Öz et al., 2010a, 2010b; Rosenbloom and Shahar, 2007), there has been relatively 
little research into the causes and considerations associated with professional driver-related 
crashes in the far-east. This is particularly surprising, given that professional drivers make up 
more of the pool of overall drivers in Hong Kong relative to the west and the middle east.  
In this paper, we examine the factors that influence the crash-risk of professional drivers 
in Hong Kong. Earlier studies in other regions of the world, such as those referenced earlier, 
suggest that driver aggressiveness, caused by high work and time pressure and resulting in a 
trade-off deliberation between traffic offence-penalties and potential income gains from saved 
time in the face of congested travel conditions, contribute to the high crash risk of professional 
drivers (Öz et al., 2010a; Rosenbloom and Shahar, 2007). In particular, speeding has been 
identified as a common aggressive driving behavior exhibited by professional drivers, and 
speeding has also been identified in many earlier studies as being the single most important 
factor impacting the occurrence and severity of roadway traffic crashes (Fitzpatrick et al., 2017; 
Watson et al., 2015; WHO, 2018). In this context, in some OECD countries, the proportion of 
drivers who self-report being guilty of excessive speeding is as high as 80% (WHO, 2018). The 
same situation manifests itself in Hong Kong, with speeding being one of the most common 
recorded traffic offences among professional drivers and drivers at large. According to the 
number of prosecutions against traffic offences in 2017, speeding accounted for over 42%, 
while red light running and drunk driving accounted for 13% and 0.17% of the total number of 
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prosecutions in Hong Kong, respectively (Hong Kong Police Force, 2018). Admittedly, these 
statistics from Hong Kong do not necessarily reflect the relative prevalence of speeding 
compared to other illegal driving behaviors, because the statistics may simply be an indication 
of the type and intensity of resources dedicated to enforcing speed limits relative to other illegal 
driving behaviors. Even so, the very fact that more investment is made in preventing speeding 
relative to other behaviors is in and of itself an acknowledgment that countermeasures aimed at 
speed reduction are considered one of the most cost-effective ways to enhance traffic safety.  
Monetary fine, driving disqualification and imprisonment are the common penalties to 
address and reduce speeding offence occurrences (as well as other driving offences; see 
Hössinger and Berger, 2012; Li et al., 2014). In Hong Kong, the Driving-offence Points (DOPs) 
system was introduced in 1984. Over 50 items of traffic offences carry DOPs in addition to a 
monetary penalty. As would be logical, more DOPs and higher monetary fines are issued as the 
level of speeding increases. Thus, a severe speeding offence (excess of speed limit by more 
than 30 km/h but less than or equal to 45 km/h) incurs five DOPs and HK$ 600 penalty 
(Transport Department, 2018). Under this DOP system, persons who have incurred 15 points 
or more within two years are disqualified from driving.  
Some previous studies have revealed a significant negative correlation between the 
monetary fine level imposed and penalty points, and the occurrence of traffic offences 
(Hössinger and Berger, 2012; Li et al., 2014; Wong et al., 2008). For example, an increase of 
fine by 10 Euros is associated with the reduction in speeding frequency by 5% among Austrian 
drivers (Hössinger and Berger, 2012). However, there are studies suggesting that monetary fine 
levels and penalty points alone have only a relatively minor deterrent effect on the speeding 
offence (Elvik and Christensen, 2007; Fleiter et al., 2010; Langlais, 2008; Ritchey and 
Nicholson-Crotty, 2011; Sagberg and Ingebrigtsen, 2018). Specifically, these studies raise the 
issue of not only the level of the penalty on speeding deterrence, but the risk of being subjected 
to that penalty (Kergoat et al., 2017; Li et al., 2014; Tay, 2009). That is, the propensity for 
speeding depends on both the level of penalty as well as the prevalence of speed enforcement 
operations, with some studies finding that the latter is much more effective in curbing speeding 
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offences than the former (see, for example, Gargoum and El-Basyouny, 2018; Lawpoolsri et 
al., 2007; Ryeng, 2012; Truelove et al., 2017). In other words, fines and DOPs penalty, 
according to these earlier studies, do not function very well when the level of speed enforcement 
is not adequate (and thus the risk of being subjected to the penalties is low). This finding also 
has backing in criminal justice-based deterrence theory (Gibbs, 1985), which stems from the 
notion that individuals effectively undertake a cost-benefit analysis of pursuing a “crime”, and 
the effectiveness of a dissuasive mechanism originates from the costs being perceived as higher 
than the benefits. The cost-benefit analysis itself is conducted within a frame of three criteria: 
the certainty, celerity (swiftness or rapidity of imposition), and the severity of a sanction. While 
the relative contributions of these three criteria may vary based on the crime under question, 
lower “crime” activities (at least as viewed traditionally by society, such as illegal driving 
behaviors) are typically dominated by the “certainty of being apprehended” criterion in the cost-
benefit evaluation of individuals (Høye, 2014; Watson et al., 2015). In the context of speeding, 
this “certainty” criterion is directly related to the level of enforcement of speed limits.  
The automated speed enforcement camera (ASEC) system is generally considered as a 
promising and cost-effective enforcement technique that increases the certainty of being 
apprehended if speeding (Carnis and Blais, 2013; De Pauw et al., 2014a; Tay, 2009). Once the 
cameras are installed, such systems obviate the need for more costly human police patrols along 
roadways. Of course, some studies suggest that human police patrols are still effective, when 
combined with ASEC systems, because many drivers feel embarrassed when confronted by a 
fellow human (that is, a police person) who is perceived as passing a judgment on one’s societal 
conduct. In addition, the fear of a verbal reprimand by the police also can add to the 
embarrassment factor, elevating the cumulative cost of being detained by a human police to be 
even higher than the fear of risking one’s life or that of others through speeding (Kergoat et al., 
2017; Silcock et al., 2000). But drivers also understand that human agents, even if equipped 
with hand-held radar/laser speed guns that provide accurate and reliable readings, can get 
fatigued over long periods of time in terms of holding and directing the speed guns in 
appropriate directions, and cannot have a consistent level of vigilance over extended periods of 
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time, leading to speeding event “misses” (see Kergoat et al., 2017). On the other hand, properly 
functioning ASEC systems are more reliable in detecting speeding violations over extended 
stretches of time. Even so, there is the issue of driver ability to dodge the dangers posed by 
spatially fixed ASEC systems (that is, an ASEC with overtly announced camera locations, as 
opposed to covert or unpublicized camera locations). In particular, according to the integrative 
social-cognitive protection-motivation theory (PMT) (see Rogers, 1983), the effectiveness of a 
“threat” (that is, a speed enforcement mechanism in the context of roadway speeding) is based 
both on threat appraisal (by way of the certainty, celerity, and severity, as proposed by 
deterrence theory) as well as coping appraisal (that is, the ability to cope with and dodge the 
danger). As an individual’s self-efficacy (the ability to perform an action needed to dodge a 
threat) and the response efficacy (the efficacy of the response to actually dodge the danger) 
increase, there will be less incentive to not commit an offence based on a positive coping 
appraisal. In the context of a spatially fixed ASEC systems, drivers typically perceive more 
controllability and a positive coping appraisal (that is, a higher belief that they have the 
capability to effectively dodge the speeding enforcement threat) by simply reducing speeds in 
the immediate vicinity of the camera locations. This so-called “kangaroo effect” (abrupt 
reductions close to camera locations and abrupt speed jumps upstream and downstream of 
locations relatively removed from the camera range) has been well-identified in earlier studies 
(De Pauw et al., 2014a, 2014b; Elvik, 1997; Marciano et al., 2015). On the other hand, previous 
studies (see, for example, Cameron et al., 2003; Dowling and Holloman, 2008) have shown the 
higher effectiveness of covert (or unmarked and unpublicized) ASEC systems relative to fixed 
ASEC systems because of a lower coping appraisal and higher uncontrollability to dodge a 
threat on the part of drivers. However, such covert ASEC systems are not legally allowed in 
Hong Kong and many other countries, both due to privacy regulations as well as the notion that 
ASEC systems should be fundamentally aimed at preventing speeding rather than apprehending 




1.1.The Current Paper 
In the current paper, we examine the effectiveness of a fixed ASEC system in Hong Kong to 
deter speeding. While Hong Kong employs a combination of human agent-based mobile speed 
enforcement mechanisms as well as a fixed ASEC system, the focus will be on a fixed ASEC 
system in this paper. In Hong Kong, the shares of speed enforcement prosecutions based on 
human agent-based mobile speed enforcement and a fixed ASEC system are about the same 
(Hong Kong Police Force, 2018). From time to time, strong public sentiment has been 
expressed to expand the ASEC system as a means not only to enhance the deterrent effect, but 
also to reduce the costs associated with police human resources. In this context, it become 
particularly imperative to evaluate the impacts of alternative designs for such an expanded 
ASEC system. While there may be benefits to supplementing an expanded automation-based 
ASEC speed enforcement mechanism with a much smaller base (relative to today) of human-
based enforcement mechanisms, examining the possible optimal combination of investments in 
such fused mechanisms is not considered here. In any case, society has consistently moved 
closer to automation in traffic operations, and it is not inconceivable at all that there will be a 
time in the near future when no human-based resources (police personnel) will be invested on 
the task of field monitoring of speed for enforcement purposes.  
Four main attributes associated with threat and coping appraisals related to an ASEC 
system are evaluated in the paper: DOP penalty, fine levels, camera-to-housing ratio (explained 
in detail later), and the placement of the warning sign. Among these four attributes, the first 
three may be considered to be associated with threat appraisal, while the last may be considered 
to be associated with coping appraisal (for instance, if a warning sign is placed farther away 
from the camera location, it may provide individuals with more time to absorb the information 
and act to adjust their speed to comply with the speed limit before arriving within the range of 
the camera detection zone). A stated preference experiment is conducted by developing 
scenarios that combine the attribute levels of the four attributes just identified. The scenarios 
are presented to professional drivers, who are asked to respond by choosing a speed level at 
which they would travel on a 50 km/h road at each of three sections of a roadway (corresponding 
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to a standard section with no enforcement and no warning, a warning section that starts from 
23 meters ahead of the placement of a warning sign, and the camera housing section itself in 
which a camera detects speeding violations).  
Driver perceptions regarding speeding consequences and driving history (current level 
of DOP points, whether received a speeding ticket in the past 12 months, and exposure to ASEC 
systems when driving), as well as driver demographic characteristics and employment 
characteristics, are also collected in the survey. These variables are considered as direct 
influencers of travel speed as well as moderating the impact of the four main attributes of the 
SP experiment (to capture inter-individual differences in perceptions of threat appraisal and 
coping appraisal of speed enforcement, as well as overall intentions to speed or not and general 
attitudes toward the risks travel speeding poses to society). In doing so, we attempt to recognize 
the direct and moderating effects of driver characteristics on travel speed levels, and contribute 
further to the literature on the effectiveness of speeding enforcement mechanisms. Many earlier 
studies of enforcement mechanisms, on the other hand, have considered drivers as a single 
monolithic group or considered variations across drivers in a relatively limited manner. In 
addition, unlike many other earlier studies on professional driver speed decisions, we consider 
unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity to accommodate unobserved individual factors 
that are likely to influence speed choices. Such heterogeneity is important to consider in travel 
choice and safety studies to ensure consistent estimation of model parameters (see, for example, 
Mannering et al., 2016). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
methodology used for data collection as well as for our analysis. Section 3 provides a 
description of the sample used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 





2. METHODOLOGY  
The data used in the current analysis is drawn from a face-to-face survey conducted during the 
period from October 2018 to February 2019 (months inclusive). Our emphasis on a face-to-face 
survey is to avoid respondent biases that may accrue from less expensive web-based and other 
social media-based surveys. The professional driver participants were approached either at on-
road parking areas (e.g. public bus, taxi, and public light bus stations) or outside the licensing 
offices of the Hong Kong Transport Department. The inclusion criteria were (1) having valid 
licences of bus, minibus, taxi or goods (cargo) vehicles, and (2) driving for income, either full-
time or part-time. Prior to the survey, the ethical approval from the Human Subjects Ethics Sub-
committee (HSESC) of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University was obtained.  
The questionnaire had three sections: (1) SP questions regarding speed choices, (2) 
Driving history and safety perceptions, and (3) Demographics and employment characteristics 
of professional drivers. The SP part is discussed in the next section. The second section 
collected information on the involvement with traffic offences and crashes, attitudes towards 
different speed enforcement measures, and actual experience with speed enforcement. The third 
section collected information on driver demographics (gender, age, education, marital status, 
and income) and employment characteristics (salary system, driving hours per day etc.)  
 
2.1 SP design 
In this study, drivers’ perceptions and attitudes towards the deterrent effect of enforcement and 
penalty against speeding was gauged using their stated speed choices in an SP survey design. 
SP surveys have been widely applied to evaluate the effects of enforcement strategies and 
speeding penalties on the propensity for traffic offences by measuring the driver’s response 
under hypothetically constructed conditions (Hössinger and Berger 2012; Li et al., 2016; Ryeng, 
2012; Wong et al., 2008). The SP questions in the current paper are based on the scenario of 
driving on an urban road with a speed limit of 50km/h. For each question, three speed choices 
are presented to drivers for each of three location sections. The location sections are defined as 
follows: (1) a standard section, defined as one with neither ASEC-based speed enforcement and 
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nor warning signs of such enforcement, (2) a warning section, defined as the road section 
indicating the presence of speed camera housing unit ahead (this section starts 23 meters ahead 
of the warning sign and ends at the location of warning sign; the design of the section length is 
based on the vision standard for the driver licensing requirement in Hong Kong), and (3) a 
camera section, defined as being within the range of speed violation detection by the camera 
(this section starts 23 meters ahead of a camera housing unit and ends at the location of the 
housing; see Figure 1). The three speed choices (one to be selected) are: (1) comply with the 
prescribed speed limit; (2) exceed the prescribed speed limit by 15 km/h or less (traveling at 
51-65 kms./hour, corresponding to speeding range 1); and (3) exceed the prescribed speed limit 
by more than 15 km/h but less than or equal to 30 km/h (traveling at 66-80 kms./hour, 
corresponding to speeding range 2). Thus, for each SP question presented, the respondent makes 
a speed choice at each of the three location sections, providing three choices.  
In each of the SP questions presented to respondents, four attributes are used to 
characterize the choice context: (1) Driving Offence Points (DOP) for different ranges of 
speeding infractions, (2) Monetary fines for different ranges of speeding infractions, (3) 
Camera-to-housing ratio, and (4) placement of the warning sign that determines the distance of 
the warning section. A screenshot of the content and format of a sample SP question is provided 
in Figure 1.  
The levels of the first attribute - DOP – were set by pivoting off the current DOP for 
each of the two speed infraction ranges (of course, there are no DOPs for being within the speed 
limit). The current DOPs are zero for speeding range 1 and three for speeding range 2. We used 
these base DOPs and also introduced a higher DOP level of two for speeding range 1 and a 
DOP level of five for speeding range 2. Thus, for each speeding range, there are two possible 
DOP levels, and across the two speeding ranges, there are a total of four possible DOP levels.   
The levels of the second attribute – monetary fine – were also set based on the current 
fine levels of 320 HKD (about US $40) for speeding range 1 and 450 HKD (about US $57) for 
speeding range 2. Again, we used these base fine levels, and also introduced increased levels 
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of 420 HKD (about US $54) for speeding range 1 and 550 HKD (about US $ 70) for speeding 
range 2. Across the two speeding ranges, there are a total of four possible fine levels.  
In Hong Kong, not all the camera housings necessarily contain a speed camera, to save 
on costs (both installation and operating costs). Thus, while Hong Kong laws require that 
citizens be informed of any camera locations, it is not required that all the announced camera 
locations necessarily have an actual functional camera. Dummy camera housing boxes are 
allowed to be installed. However, the ratio of actual speed cameras to camera housings must be 
publicized. The current ratio of speed camera-to-housing is 1:6. In particular, there are 20 speed 
cameras and 120 housings across the entire territory of Hong Kong (Audit Commission of 
HKSAR, 2013). Four levels of the third attribute -- camera-to-housing ratio -- are set out by 
either increasing the number of housings or increasing the number of cameras: 20:240, 20:120 
(status quo), 40:120, and 60:120. An analysis of how Hong Kong professional drivers respond 
to different camera-to-housing levels can inform speed enforcement strategies considering the 
economic constraints of the transport authority.  
Finally, four levels of the fourth attribute associated with the placement of the warning 
sign are considered: 50 meters, 100 meters, 150 meters, and 200 meters upstream of the speed 
camera housing (see Figure 1). Exploring the effect of the placement of the warning sign helps 
better understand alternative coping mechanisms, and can provide insights regarding the 
optimal placement of the warning sign that can minimize the “Kangaroo effect” associated with 




All the levels for each of the attributes were tested extensively for reasonability in pilot 
surveys, and several changes were made before arriving at the final levels. In all, the SP 
experiments have four factors, each with four levels. If the full factorial design were considered, 
there would be 256 (4  4  4  4) combinations of factor attributes in total for the SP 
question. It is however not efficient and feasible to gauge the drivers’ perceptions and attitudes 
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if all the 256 combinations of scenarios are used. Therefore, an orthogonal fractional factorial 
design (Bhat and Sardesai, 2006; Hössinger and Berger, 2012; Lavieri and Bhat, 2019; Li et al., 
2014) was adopted to reduce the number of combinations from 256 to 16. Further, our design 
enabled us to estimate models that are more general than the multinomial logit model by 
maintaining factor orthogonality within and between alternatives. Our design allowed for the 
estimation of main effects of attributes, as well as two-way interaction effects between attributes 
and respondent characteristics. Next, we developed a block design of four sets of four SP 
scenarios, because it would be too much burden to ask each respondent to answer 16 SP 
questions. Each participant was then presented with one of the four blocks of four SP scenarios 
in the survey. The entire survey instrument is available at http://www.baige.me/v?i=RxE. 
 
2.2. Econometric modeling framework 
In this paper, we formulate a panel mixed multinomial logit (or MMNL) model for the speed 
choice of professional drivers. The panel MMNL model formulation accommodates 
heterogeneity across individuals due to both observed and unobserved individual attributes, 
while also recognizing correlations among the different observations of a same individual. In 
the following discussion of the model structure, we will use the index q (q = 1, 2, …, Q) for the 
decision-makers, i for the speed alternative (i = 1, 2, …, I) and k for the choice occasion, i.e. 
SP choice occasions for a particular decision-maker, (k = 1, 2, …, K). In the current study I = 3 
(as indicated earlier, the choice alternatives are speed compliance, or speeding range 1, or 
speeding range 2) and K = 4*3 = 12 for all q. Within each of the four SP attribute scenarios 
presented, the respondents were asked to state their speed range choice in three different 
sections – standard, warning, and camera housing sections. 
In the usual tradition of utility maximizing models of choice, we write the utility or 
valuation qikU  that an individual q associates with the alternative i (speed range) on choice 
occasion k as follows: 
qikqikqqik xvU   )( ,                     (1) 
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where qikx  is a )1( M -column vector affecting the valuation of individual q for alternative i 
at the kth choice occasion, and that includes the following: (1) choice-occasion specific 
attributes (that is, the four attributes varied in the SP experiments), (2) alternative-specific 
constants for speeding ranges 1 and 2 (with no speeding being the base category), (3) individual-
specific attributes (driving history and perception, driver demographics and employment 
characteristics), and (4) interactions within each of the choice-specific and individual-specific 
variables, as well as across the two sets of variables. β is a corresponding )1( M -column 
vector of the mean effects of the coefficients of qikx  on speeding range valuations, and qv  is 
another )1( M -column vector with its mth element representing unobserved factors specific to 
individual q that moderate the influence of the corresponding mth element of the vector qikx . 
A natural assumption is to consider the elements of the qv  vector to be independent 
realizations from a normal population distribution; ),0(~ 2mqm Nv  . qik  represents a 
choice-occasion specific idiosyncratic random error term assumed to be identically and 
independently standard Gumbel distributed. qik  is assumed to be independent of qkx .  
For a given value of the vector qv , the probability that individual q will choose speed 





















                     (2) 





 F                 (3) 
where F is the multivariate cumulative normal distribution and σ is a vector that stacks up the 
m  elements across all m. The reader will note that the dimensionality in the integration above 
is dependent on the number of elements in the qv  vector. 
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 The parameters to be estimated in the model of Equation (3) are the β and σ vectors.  
To develop the likelihood function for parameter estimation, we need the probability of each 
individual's sequence of observed SP choices. Conditional on qv , the likelihood function for 

















|)|(  ,                       (4) 
where qik  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the qth individual chooses the ith  
speed range in the kth occasion, and 0 otherwise. The unconditional likelihood function for 
individual q’s observed set of choices is: 

qv
qqqq vdFvLL )|()|(),(                 (5) 
The log-likelihood function is ),(ln),(  qq LL  . We apply quasi-Monte Carlo 
simulation techniques to approximate the integrals in the likelihood function and maximize the 
logarithm of the resulting simulated likelihood function across all individuals with respect to 
the parameters β and σ. Under rather weak regularity conditions, the maximum (log) simulated 
likelihood (MSL) estimator is consistent, asymptotically efficient, and asymptotically normal 
(see Hajivassiliou and Ruud, 1994; Lee and Carter, 1992; McFadden and Train, 2000).   
In the current paper, we use Halton sequences to draw realizations for qv  from its 
assumed normal distribution. Details of the Halton sequence and the procedure to generate this 
sequence are available in Bhat (2001, 2003). 
 
3. DATA AND SAMPLE USED 
A total of 401 professional drivers completed the questionnaire survey. Therefore, the dataset 
has a total of 401x12=4,812 SP choice occasions, with 1604 choice occasions at each of the 
three location sections (standard, warning, and camera). The distribution of the dependent 
variable was as follows within the 1604 choice occasions, as also shown in Table 1: (1) 
Standard section – Not speeding (14.1%), Speeding Range 1 (71.2%), and Speeding Range 2 
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(14.7%), (2) Warning section – Not speeding (57.2%), Speeding Range 1 (40.0%), and 
Speeding Range 2 (2.8%), (3) Camera housing section – Not speeding (99.8%), Speeding 
Range 1 (0.2%), and Speeding Range 2 (0%). As can be observed from these descriptive 
statistics, drivers combine their threat and coping appraisals due to which a large proportion of 
them are generally willing to speed at the standard section (at least at speed range 1), but are 
more likely to adhere to the speed limit at the camera housing section. Indeed, there is literally 
no variation in adherence at the camera housing section regardless of the levels of DOP, 
monetary fine, camera-to-housing ratio, warning sign placement, as well as driver 
characteristics. Thus, we drop the 1604 choice occasion observations corresponding to the 
camera housing section in our analysis, because they do not contribute to understanding the 
effects of independent variables on speeding ranges. The final sample for analysis includes the 
3208 choice occasions at the standard and warning sections.  
 
<Table1> 
 Table 2 shows cross-tabulations of the four SP attributes with speed choice percentages 
at each of the standard and warning sections. As expected, increasing the DOP penalty by two 
points decreased the percentage of drivers choosing for speeding range 1 and speeding range 2 
in the standard section. Further, increasing the DOP penalty by two points for both speeding 
levels led to a greater percentage of drivers complying with speed limit. The descriptive 
statistics do not show a clear trend of the speed choices with respect to increasing monetary 
fines. Interestingly, in the standard section, it seems that a greater proportion of drivers choose 
to speed when the fine is increased. More discussion on this will follow in the model results 
section. In the context of camera-to-housing ratio values, an increase in the ratio from status 
quo (20:120) to 40:120 shows a greater decrease in the percentage of drivers choosing speed 
ranges 1 or 2 than that from increasing the ratio further to 60:120. It appears that the bang per 
buck is greater for increasing the ratio from 20:120 to 40:120 than that to 60:120. As for the 
placement of warning sign, there is a monotonous trend of increasing percentage of speed 
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compliance choice with decreasing distance between the warning sign and the camera housing 
location. 
Of course, the discussion above does not consider differential effects of the SP attributes 
based on observed and unobserved driver characteristics, which is the focus of the multivariate 




3.2. Driver demographics and employment characteristics   
Table 3 presents the demographic and other characteristics of the 401 participants, beginning 
with the demographic characteristics in the first set of rows. All participants of this study are 
male. This is consistent with the distribution of employed persons by occupation and gender in 
the population census dataset, which indicates that 97% of workers in the machine operation 
sector are male (Census and Statistic Department, 2018a). Although the information on the 
official registry of professional drivers in Hong Kong is not available, male drivers are believed 
to dominate the transport sector. The age distribution of our sample is close to that of the driving 
licensing record of general drivers in Hong Kong (Transport Department, 2017). In terms of 
educational background, 79% of the drivers in our sample have attained at least secondary 
education (the closest possible comparison at the Hong Kong-wide level is that 89% of male 
workers in Hong Kong have attained secondary education (Census and Statistic Department, 
2018b). In our sample, 73% of the drivers were married (the closest possible comparison is the 
most updated marital status statistics in Hong Kong, which indicates that 62% of the males are 
married (Census and Statistic Department, 2018c). Interestingly, almost all (395 of the 401) 
drivers provided their monthly income values. For the remaining six drivers who did not 
provide this information, we imputed the income values based on the procedure discussed in 
Bhat (1997). A little over 31% of the drivers have a monthly income below HK$ 15,000 and a 
little over 21% of the sample earn over HK$ 20,000.  
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Drivers’ employment characteristics are presented in the next set of rows in the table. 
The salary system of professional drivers is stratified into three categories: (i) trip-based (34% 
of the sample), (ii) monthly-based (31%), and (iii) others (hourly or shift based, 35%). The trip-
based drivers are self-employed, and their incomes vary greatly with the number and distance 
of trips made (e.g. taxi, red minibus and light van drivers). The drivers who are paid on a 
monthly basis are usually regular employees of a large corporation or transport operator, such 
as the franchised bus companies and logistic firms. The hourly or shift based drivers are usually 
(full-time or part-time) employees of small transport operators, such as the green minibus. Their 
salaries vary greatly with the daily working time. As for the daily driving hours, 8% of our 
sample drive for less than or equal to 7 hours per day while 42% of them drive for more than 9 
hours daily. The corresponding statistic from official reports is not accessible. The closest 
possible comparison is that 51% of bus drivers in Hong Kong drive for more than 9 hours daily 
(Legislative Council of HKSAR, 2018). In terms of weekly working hours, 46% of drivers in 
our sample work for 48 hours or less per week, which is comparable to the 50% of employees 
in the transport sector who work for less than or equal to 48 hours a week. However, only 9% 
of our sample work for more than or equal to 63 hours per week, while the corresponding 
percentage in the transport sector is close to 25% (Census and Statistic Department, 2018b). 
The commercial vehicles driven by our sample are categorized into four types – bus, green 
minibus, taxi and red minibus, and goods vehicles (accounting for 17%, 14%, 39%, and 30% 
of the sample respectively). The official distribution for the vehicle types of the commercial 
vehicle fleet in Hong Kong is not accessible.  
Overall, the characteristics of drivers in the sample are reasonably close to general 
expectations for Hong Kong professional drivers, at least based on the latest statistics gleaned 
from the Census. Of course, one cannot be conclusive of the true representativeness of our 
sample because there is no official registry of professional drivers in Hong Kong, and the closest 
comparison we are able to make is with the population census demographics for people 




3.3. Driver history and safety perceptions 
The last set of rows in Table 3 report the descriptive statistics for driving history and safety 
perceptions of the 401 participants, which might influence how they would respond to the SP 
choice questions. As can be observed from these rows, 25% of the interviewed professional 
drivers have received at least one speeding ticket in the recent past. 70% of the drivers perceived 
speeding as a cause of injury while only 1.5% perceived a small effect of speeding on traffic 
injuries. As for the perception on effectiveness of cameras, 67% of drivers believed that 
speeding cameras are effective in catching offenders, while a smaller percentage (6%) 
perceived low effectiveness of this enforcement technique. The frequency of drivers sighting 
camera housings was also collected in terms of the number of times a driver would sight camera 
housings in 10 trips. It appears that a majority (62%) of the drivers do usually visually locate 
camera housings at a frequency of at least 7 times in 10 trips. 
All the above driver history and perception variables are likely to influence drivers’ 
responses to the SP choice questions. Also, while we make no claim of our sample being 
representative of the population of professional drivers, there is no reason to believe that the 
individual-level relationship we develop between speed range choices and SP attributes/driver 
characteristics would not be applicable for the general population of professional drivers. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 4 presents the results of a panel mixed multinomial logit model estimated on the afore-
mentioned 3,208 observations – 1604 for the standard section and 1604 for the warning section1 
– with normal distributed random coefficients2. The dependent variable is speed choice (i.e. 
                                                 
1 Recall from the descriptive analysis of the SP choice data for the camera housing section that only a single 
alternative (speed compliance) was chosen 99.8% of the times. So, these data were not included in the model as 
the speed choice is deterministic in the camera housing section. This observation is consistent with the findings of 
previous studies that drivers would slow down when they notice or are warned of cameras (De Pauw et al., 2014a; 
De Pauw et al., 2014b; Elvik, 1997; Marciano and Norman, 2015). 
2 We also explored alternative distributional assumptions such as log-normal for the random coefficients, but the 
model with normal distribution provided the best fit. Besides, other distributions did not offer substantive 
interpretations that were very different from the model with normal distributions. 
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speed compliance, speeding range 1, or speeding range 2; with speed compliance considered as 
the base alternative). For each independent variable, a common coefficient was estimated for 
both standard and warning sections as well as a difference coefficient was introduced to account 
for the differential effect of that variable on the warning section compared to the standard 
section. In Table 4, the parameter estimates reported under the “Standard section” column are 
that of the common coefficients, which may also be interpreted as coefficients for the standard 
section. The parameter estimates under the “Difference between Warning and Standard section” 
column are the difference coefficients. For a given variable, a sum of its common coefficient 
and the difference coefficient would give its coefficient for the warning section. The parameter 
estimates are interpreted and discussed next in Sections 4.1-4.4. The coefficients on the 
constants indicate a general aversion to speeding, especially at level 2, at both the standard and 
warning sections. This aversion is typically higher in the warning section than in the standard 
section, though there is unobserved heterogeneity (captured by the significant standard 
deviation estimates on the constants) in these general trends (the panel nature of the data allows 
us to estimate the standard deviations on the constants in the table). 
An important note is in order here. All results in this paper pertain to the influence of 
variables on the reported speed choices in our stated experiments, not actual speed choices in 
the real world. But, for presentation ease and tightness, we do not belabor over this distinction 
in the rest of this paper and use the general word “speeding”. However, all our statements should 
be viewed in the context of stated speed choices, not actual speed choices.  
 
< Table 4> 
 
4.1 Effects of penalty level and enforcement strategy  
Among the SP attributes for penalty and enforcement, the DOP variable shows a statistically 
significant deterrence on speeding in both standard and warning sections, with higher 
deterrence in the warning section than in the standard section. Professional drivers are indeed, 
generically speaking, sensitive to the increase in DOPs since incurring DOPs may lead to 
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disqualification of driving license, which is the source of their livelihood (Wong et al., 2008). 
However, there is significant heterogeneity in the influence of the DOP variable both due to 
observed and unobserved factors. Specifically, drivers who were recently issued a ticket are 
more likely than their peers to be deterred by DOPs when traveling in the warning section. 
Considerable unobserved heterogeneity also exists in the influence of DOPs on drivers’ 
speeding choices in both standard and warning sections. Interestingly, the standard deviation of 
the DOP coefficient in the warning section is higher than in the standard section, implying that 
the deterrent effect of an increased DOP penalty tends to be more diverse in the warning section 
despite its greater deterrent effect on average. This finding could be attributed to the 
heterogeneity in driver’s threat and coping appraisals of the warning messages (Kergoat et al., 
2017), as well as the effects of drivers’ characteristics on the comprehension of traffic signs 
(Ng and Chan, 2008). For example, different drivers may perceive the self-efficacy of avoiding 
the speeding penalty differently when forewarned about camera enforcement. Thus, some 
drivers may actually initially increase their speeds as soon as they encounter the warning section 
(to compensate for the fact that they have to reduce speeds at the downstream camera section) 
because they feel confident in their ability (self-efficacy) to estimate where the camera section 
will begin and in their ability to decelerate at the right time to avoid speeding penalties in the 
camera section. Other drivers may immediately reduce their speed upon encountering the 
warning section because they feel less confident in their ability to take evasive speed reduction 
actions later downstream to avoid penalties in the camera section. Such variations in self-
efficacy are likely to get magnified as the DOP penalty increases in the camera section, leading 
to the higher speed variance in the warning section as the DOP penalty increases. 
Unlike the deterrent effect of DOPs, the monetary fines variable turned out to have a 
marginally positive coefficient in the standard section suggesting an increase in the propensity 
for speeding with an increase in fines. While this may be a coping mechanism to “make up” 
time in the standard section in anticipation of lost time due to adherence to speed limits in the 
warning section, we noted that this effect had a strong interaction with the length of the warning 
section. Thus, we chose to drop this variable and include the length of the warning section as 
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the primary determinant variable in our model (more on this warning section length effect later). 
In the warning section itself, monetary fines are associated with a negative coefficient for a 
majority of the sample (obtained from the mean and standard deviation of the corresponding 
random coefficient), suggesting a deterrent effect of monetary fine when it is combined with a 
warning of speed enforcement ahead for a majority of the drivers. Furthermore, there is 
heterogeneity in response to fines in the warning section based on driver characteristics. 
Specifically, in warning sections, monetary fines have a larger deterrent effect (in the context 
of speeding) for drivers who are paid on a per-trip basis and those with a recent speeding ticket 
relative to other drivers. These results are again an illustration of the interplay between drivers’ 
threat and coping appraisal mechanisms, where drivers respond to the threat of a monetary fine 
when they are made aware of the cameras that will increase the likelihood of them being fined. 
And such interplay appears to vary across drivers based on both observed and unobserved 
factors.  
In the context of camera-based enforcement strategy, reducing the camera-to-housing 
ratio from the status quo (i.e., from 20:120 to 20:240 camera-to-housing ratio) did not show a 
statistically significant effect on the drivers’ stated speeding choices. However, drivers were 
less likely to opt for severe speeding (range 2) in both the standard and warning sections when 
the camera to housing ratio was increased from the status quo. This is presumably because an 
increase in the number of camera installations would result in an increased “threat” of being 
apprehended for speed limit violations. Interestingly, the standard deviation associated with the 
coefficient of a minor increase in camera-to-housing variable suggests that a small fraction (9%) 
of the drivers tend to choose speeding with an increase in camera-to-housing. This result may 
be attributed to the risk-taking behaviors of such individuals as well as heterogeneity in 
perceiving a threat of apprehension due to a minor increase in the number of cameras. However, 
with a major increase in the camera-to-housing ratio, this risk-taking behavior reduces, perhaps 
due to a greater perception of the threat of apprehension.  
The placement of the warning sign – that is, the distance of the warning sign from the 
camera housing location – exhibits an influence on speeding in the warning section. Specifically, 
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reducing the distance between the warning sign and the housing unit leads to lower speeding 
tendencies (for both speeding ranges). This is intuitive as individuals may want to start slowing 
down (or at least not speed) to avoid sudden decelerations just before arriving at the camera 
housing. In fact, the presence of a warning sign (upstream of a fixed speed camera) has been 
found to be associated with reductions in mean driving speed and proportion of more severe 
speeding (Retting et al., 2008; Høye, 2014). Kergoat et al. (2017) postulated that the distance 
between warning sign and speed camera should be increased to weaken the “Kangaroo effect”. 
However, the parameter estimates for speeding range 2 suggest a heightened increase in the 
propensity to choose that speeding range when the warning sign is installed 150m or 200m 
upstream of a camera housing. That is, our results suggest that the deterrent effect of a warning 
sign could in fact be diminished when the distance between the warning sign and the housing 
unit increases excessively. That is, as drivers learn that the warning signs are placed farther 
away from the housing, they speed up because they know they have a larger cushion to 
decelerate and they also want to make up some time in anticipation of slowing down closer to 
the actual camera housing location. Basically, as warning signs are placed farther away from 
the camera housing, professional drivers start to view the early part of the warning section as a 
“standard” section. This indicates a need for optimal placement of warning sign that can 
tradeoff between the “Kangaroo effect” and effectiveness of the warning sign in deterring 
speeding behavior.  
  
4.2 Effects of demographic characteristics of professional drivers  
Driver age does not have a strong association with speeding behavior in the standard section. 
This could be because all professional drivers, regardless of age, tend to be more aggressive 
when there is no speed enforcement and no warning (Öz et al., 2010a, Wong et al., 2008). In 
contrast, in the warning section, older drivers are less likely to speed up to range 1 and younger 
drivers are more likely to speed up to range 2. These results suggest that the likelihood of 
speeding offences decreases with driver age, perhaps because older drivers tend to be more 
cautious (Ram and Chand, 2016; Rosenbloom and Shahar, 2007) but younger people are more 
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likely to be sensation- and thrill-seeking (Delhomme et al., 2012; Fernandes et al., 2010; Tseng, 
2013). In the context of education background, individuals with up to primary level education 
are more likely to speed up to range 1 in both standard and warning sections. Previous studies 
also suggest that professional drivers with higher education attainment are less likely to commit 
traffic offences (Mallia et al., 2015; Mehdizadeh et al., 2018; Tronsmoen, 2010). Married 
drivers (relative to those who are single) are less likely to speed in both the standard and warning 
sections (see Mehdizadeh et al., 2018 and Wong et al., 2008 for similar findings), perhaps 
because married individuals, due to their familial responsibilities, tend to be more responsible 
in driving than single individuals. 
Individuals with high monthly income (>20K), ceteris paribus, are more likely than 
others to choose to violate speed limits in warning sections. This is perhaps because they can 
afford to pay the fines. Also, recall from earlier discussion that the maximum fine of HK$550 
for speeding range 2 is a rather small percentage of HK$ 20K per month. In contrast, the 
maximum monetary fine for speeding can reach 50% of average monthly incomes of taxi 
drivers in the United States (United States Department of labor, 2018) and 35% in the United 
Kingdom (Sentencing Council, 2017), respectively. In road safety research, deterrence theory 
is widely used to investigate driver’s perception of the sanctions (in terms of severity, certainty 
and celerity) for traffic offences (Kergoat et al., 2017; Li et al., 2014; Tay, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 
2009). It is based on the idea that people avoid committing a crime due to the threat and fear of 
being legally punished, which also involves an evaluation of the costs and benefits of the crime 
(Gibbs, 1985). In this sense, the ratio of the cost (monetary fine) to the benefits (possible income) 
of speeding offence is indeed quite low in Hong Kong.  
 
4.3 Effects of operational characteristics of professional drivers 
As discussed earlier, drivers who earn on a per-trip basis (i.e., trip-based salary) are more likely 
to be deterred by monetary fines in the context of speeding in warning sections. Regardless of 
the level of monetary fines, the coefficients of the trip-based salary dummy variable suggest 
that such drivers are more likely than others to commit speeding offences in both the standard 
 
23 
and warning sections. Since their earnings depend on the number and distance of the trips made, 
trip-based salaried drivers have a higher incentive to speed up to arrive at the destination quickly. 
In Hong Kong, trip-based drivers (these are typically drivers of taxis, light vans, red minibuses 
etc.) are generally self-employed and are not well-regulated (Meng et al., 2017; Wong et al., 
2008). In contrast, the monthly-salaried drivers are typically regular employees of large 
transport operators and logistics firms with good safety culture and driver management systems 
(Newnam et al., 2004; Öz et al., 2010b, 2013) including GPS-based tracking of vehicle speeds. 
These factors also have a bearing on the salary system-based differences in speeding choices.  
Individuals who drive for more than nine hours per day have a lower inclination than 
others to violate speed limits. This could be attributed to the possible driver fatigue caused by 
a prolonged driving time. Drivers may adopt a compensation strategy by reducing their speed 
to lower their risk of fatigue-related crashes (Williamson et al., 2002). In contrast, individuals 
who drive for less than eight hours per day are associated with a greater likelihood (than others) 
of violating speed limits in the warning section. This finding will need further investigation to 
assess its robustness.  
In the context of vehicle type, drivers of all types of vehicles other than buses have a 
higher tendency of speeding up in both standard and warning sections, albeit they are relatively 
less likely to speed up in warning sections than in standard sections. Indeed, minibus drivers 
and taxi drivers in Hong Kong have been recognized as problematic and risk-taking groups 
(Meng et al., 2017; Wong et al., 2008). On the other hand, goods vehicle drivers are paid to 
drive for the transport of goods while bus drivers are to drive for the transport of passengers. A 
greater sense of social responsibility on bus drivers might make them less aggressive (at least 
in a stated preference setting) than the drivers of other types of vehicles (Paleti et al., 2010). 
 
4.4 Driver history and safety perceptions 
Driving history and safety perceptions have a substantial influence on the participants’ stated 
speed choices. For instance, drivers who recently received a traffic ticket are associated with a 
greater likelihood of speeding in both standard and warning sections (albeit the tendency for 
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speeding range 2 is lower in warning sections than that in standard sections). Further, as 
discussed earlier in the context of interaction between this variable with the SP attributes, 
increasing fines or DOP appears to reduce the speeding tendency of these drivers in warning 
sections. However, even at the highest level of fine and DOP values presented in the SP 
experiment, these drivers show a higher tendency (than others without recent tickets) to violate 
speed limits. These results suggest that risk-taking behavior and aggressive driving styles of 
these drivers overshadow any deterrent effect from receiving a speeding ticket (Sagberg and 
Ingebrigtsen, 2018). It appears that simply imposing fines or DOPs might not suffice to reduce 
the aggressive driving traits of such drivers. This result suggests a need for additional 
investigations to assess the effectiveness of combining DOPs and fines with driver training 
programs aimed to reduce risk-taking and aggressive driving traits.  
Individuals who perceive that speeding does not cause injuries have a higher tendency 
of opting for speed range 2 in both standard and warning sections. This aligns with the previous 
findings that drivers with lower risk perception tend to be associated with aggressive driving 
behaviors (Cestac et al., 2011; Rosenbloom, 2003). In addition, drivers who perceive that 
cameras are highly effective in catching offenders are associated with a lower tendency of 
speeding in speed range 2 in the warning section, while their disposition for speed range 1 is 
not statistically different from compliance. Individuals who sight speed enforcement camera 
housings more frequently (in at least 7 out of 10 trips) have a lower tendency of speeding in 
range 2 (in both standard and warning sections). This could be attributed to the perceived higher 
level of enforcement, which may contribute to the decrease in driver’s speeding intention 
(Blincoe et al., 2006; Hössinger and Berger, 2012) at least in the high-speed range.  
 
4.5 Marginal effects due to changes in SP attributes   
The model was applied to estimate marginal effects on market shares (of speed choice) in 
response to changes in the SP attributes. As shown in Table 5, the marginal effects were 
computed for both the standard and warning sections. According to these results, an increase in 
the DOP by 1 point resulted in greater than 4% increase in compliance in both the sections. In 
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the context of monetary fines, a 10% increase resulted in only a 1.73% increase in compliance. 
Such a low marginal effect is consistent with the discussion of model estimation results that 
monetary fines alone might not significantly deter professional drivers from speed violations. 
Note that the percentage reduction in the share of drivers who would opt for speeding range 2 
is high (13.02%). However, such a high percentage reduction is an artifact of a rather small 
proportion of drivers choosing this option in the base case.  
Increasing camera-to-housing ratio from the status quo (20:120) to 40:120 shows a 
considerable (at least 29%) decrease in the share of drivers choosing speed range 2. However, 
the decrease is not substantial when the ratio is increased to 60:120. This suggests that the 
marginal benefit from increasing the camera-to-housing ratio beyond 40:120 might not be 
substantial. Furthermore, since the proportion of drivers choosing speed range 2 is itself very 
small (1%), even a 32% decrease in this share due to increasing the ratio to 60:120 does not 
appear to hold practical effectiveness. 
In the context of the placement of warning sign, increase in the distance between the 
warning sign from 100m is associated with a substantial increase in the proportion of drivers 
choosing to speed in the warning section. Even if we neglect these increases for speed range 2 
(due to a rather small base market share for this alternative), the increases in the proportion of 
people choosing speed range 1 is substantial when the distance is increased. These results 
suggest the need for an optimal placement of warning sign that can tradeoff between the 





This study applied a stated preference survey and a panel mixed logit model to evaluate the 
deterrent effects of penalty and enforcement strategies – DOP penalty, monetary fines, and 
speed enforcement cameras along with a warning of such enforcement – on the propensity and 
severity of speeding among professional drivers. In doing so, the study controlled for the effects 
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of driver demographics and operational characteristics as well as driver history and safety 
perceptions. As importantly, observed and unobserved heterogeneity were incorporated in 
drivers’ responses to penalty and enforcement strategies. A panel mixed logit model is estimated 
and applied to understand the effectiveness of penalties and enforcement strategies on driver’s 
speeding behaviors. 
The results indicate that an increase in DOP penalty is more effective as a deterrent 
against speeding than increasing monetary fines. This could be attributed to the higher 
sensitivity of professional drivers to the increase in DOPs since incurring more DOPs may lead 
to disqualification of the driving licence. Monetary fines were not found to be very effective, 
perhaps because the monetary fine levels were very low relative to the income levels of the 
drivers. It remains to be explored if increasing the quantity of fines combined with appropriate 
warning messages (such as “Check speed––fines up to $1000”) can help increase the 
effectiveness of monetary fines. Significant heterogeneity was found in the influence of the 
DOP variable both due to observed and unobserved factors. Specifically, while increasing DOP 
deters all drivers from speeding, doing so when combined with a warning (i.e., in the warning 
sections) appears to more strongly deter those who recently received a speeding ticket than 
others. However, the unobserved variation in the warning section is greater than that in the 
standard section, perhaps because of differences in drivers’ threat and coping appraisals of the 
warning messages, as discussed in section 4.1.  
In the context of camera-based enforcement strategy, increasing the ratio from status 
quo (20:120) to 40:120 showed a considerable effect (29%) on reducing the percentage of 
drivers opting for severe speeding, albeit it should be noted that the base percentage of drivers 
in this category is only 1%. Increasing it further to 60:120 did not show a substantial effect in 
the policy simulations we conducted. Further, reducing the ratio from the status quo (20:120) 
to 20:240 did not show a significant effect on the drivers’ stated speeding choices.  
The placement of the warning sign – that is, the distance of the warning sign from the 
camera housing location – exhibits an influence on speeding behaviors in the warning section. 
Placing it close to the camera housing location decreases the likelihood of speeding but can 
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potentially increase the “kangaroo” effect. And placing it too far from the camera location 
would substantially increase the percentage of speeding behaviors. These findings suggest a 
need for the optimal location of warning signs. Alternatively, information on the penalty level 
can be added to the warning signs to increase the threat appraisal of the driver for reducing 
speeding behaviors in warning sections. 
The demographic characteristics of drivers such as age, education, income have an 
influence on how drivers respond to strategies aimed at increasing speed compliance. Similarly, 
the drivers’ operational characteristics, driving history and perceptions have a substantial 
bearing on the efficacy of speed compliance strategies. Therefore, targeted driver educational 
and training campaigns might help increase the speed compliance rates in the population. For 
example, drivers with a recent history of traffic tickets continue to demonstrate a greater 
tendency for speeding even for high levels of DOP and monetary fines. It appears that simply 
imposing fines or DOPs might not suffice to reduce the aggressive driving traits of such drivers. 
A combination of DOPs and fines with driver training programs aimed at addressing risk-taking 
and aggressive driving traits may be needed to increase safe driving tendencies among these 
drivers. Further, higher penalties may be considered for repeat offenders to enhance the 
deterrent effect of the penalties (Watson et al., 2015). Similar penalty strategies have been 
applied for repeat offenders of drink driving in Hong Kong (Li et al., 2014). 
Speeding and other traffic offences may be attributed to drivers’ goals of travel time 
saving and revenue maximization (Cestac et al., 2011; Peer, 2010; Tarko, 2009), while safe 
driving performance and social responsibility may be lower in the hierarchy of professional 
drivers’ goals (Hatakka et al., 2002). Therefore, inclusion of positive motives and goals in the 
education/training and licensing of professional drivers may be beneficial. In addition, 
technology-based interventions, such as GPS-based automated speed surveillance and related 
automated speed enforcement mechanisms, may aid in reducing speeding behaviors. 
The results from this study help enhance the current understanding and effectiveness of 
penalties and speed-enforcement strategies (i.e. penalties, warning signs, camera housings, etc.). 
Yet, this study is limited to the assessment of a few demographics and operational 
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characteristics of professional drivers. It would be worth exploring the possible effects of latent 
characteristics on speeding propensity and severity, when more comprehensive information on 
the physiological and psychological metrics of the participants is available. Moreover, results 
of this questionnaire survey are derived from a scenario of a typical city road with a speed limit 
of 50km/h. It would be interesting to explore the effect of other road environments, such as an 
expressway with a speed limit of 70 km/h or higher, on the speeding behavior of professional 
drivers. Further, it would be helpful to undertake a study that evaluates the effectiveness of 
combining speeding penalties with driver education/training campaigns in reducing risk-taking 
and aggressive driving. Also, the separation between the placement of a warning sign and the 
camera housing unit was expressed as a distance in the current study. Perhaps a time separation 
rather than a space separation would be a better approach to capture how individuals respond 
to warning signs before entering monitored roadway section. Yet another line of research would 
be to investigate whether fixed ASEC systems, when complemented with a small human police 
force, would have a higher impact in reducing speeding than a fixed ASEC system alone. And, 
if so, what may be the optimal combination of investment in human-based and machine-based 
enforcement mechanisms. Perhaps most importantly, all the results and recommendations in 
this paper are based on self-reported speed indications within stated experiments, which clearly 
can influence the reliability and accuracy of the relationships estimated. A study based on an 
actual field experimental design and field observations of speed at different sections would be 
more credible.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1 Distribution of speed choices by location type 
Section Speed choice 
Speed compliance Speeding range 1  Speeding range 2 
(<50 km/h)  (51-65 km/h)  (66-80 km/h)   
Count % Count % Count % 
Standard 226 14.1 1142 71.2 236 14.7 
Warning 918 57.2 641 40.0 45 2.8 
Camera Housing 1600 99.8 4 0.2 0 0 
 
Table 2. Crosstabulation of SP attributes with speed choices at plain and warning sections 
Factor 




Speed choice % 























 <50   51-65  66-80 km/h 
DOPs 
0      0      3 
(status quo) 
13.2% 69.6% 17.2% 54.6%  2.6% 2.8% 
 0      0      5 12.0% 73.6% 14.4% 52.5%  3.8% 3.7% 
 0      2      3 13.2% 68.6% 18.2% 53.7%  4.3% 2.0% 




0     320    450 
(status quo) 
11.8% 73.3% 14.9% 54.8%  1.3% 3.9% 
0     320    550 15.2% 64.6% 20.2% 57.4%  9.9% 2.7% 
 0     420    450 14.5% 78.6% 6.9% 59.9%  8.7% 1.4% 





20:240 12.7% 71.8% 15.5% 57.9%  8.7% 3.4% 
20: 120  
(status quo) 
13.5% 67.3% 19.2% 55.6%  0.1% 4.3% 
40:120 13.7% 72.6% 13.7% 58.4%  8.7% 2.9% 




50m upstream -- -- -- 77.8%  2.2% 0% 
100m upstream  -- -- -- 65.3%  1.2% 3.5% 
150 m upstream -- -- -- 43.1%  3.9% 3% 





Table 3 Distribution of the sample 
Variable Count % 
Demographics   
Gender (Male) 401 100% 
Age   
    Older (>55 years old) 98 24.4 
    Younger (<45 years old) 151 37.7 
    Mid-aged (46-55 years old) 152 37.9 
Education   
    Primary or below 84 20.9 
    Secondary or above 317 79.1 
Marital status   
    Married  293 73.1 
    Unmarried 108 26.9 
Monthly income   
    less than 15K 127 31.7 
    Between 15K and 20K 183 45.6 
    More than 20K 85 21.2 
Operational characteristics   
Salary system   
Trip-based 136 33.9 
Monthly-based 126 31.4 
Others (hourly or shift based) 139 34.7 
Daily driving hours   
    More than 9 hours 168 41.9 
Less than 8 hours 39 9.7 
8 to 9 hours (normal working hours) 194 48.4 
Work time per week   
less than or equal to 48 hours 184 45.9 
more than or equal to 63 hours 37 9.2 
Others 179 44.9 
Vehicle type   
    Bus 67 16.7 
Taxi and Red Minibus 157 39.2 
Green minibus 56 14.0 
Goods vehicle 121 30.2 
Driver history and safety perceptions   
Received speeding ticket(s)   
Yes 99 24.7 
No 302 75.3 
Perceive speeding as a cause of injury   
High 281 70.1 
Low 6 1.5 
Neutral 114 28.4 
Perceive speeding cameras are effective   
High 270 67.3 
Low 24 6.0 
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Neutral 107 26.7 
Frequency of sighting cameras   
High (7-10 times in 10 trips) 250 62.3 
Medium (4-6 times in 10 trips) 98 24.4 
Low (0-3 times in 10 trips) 53 13.3 
Table 4 Parameter estimates of a panel MMNL model for the speed choice of professional drivers* 
 
les 
Standard section Difference between warning and standard sections
Speed 
compliance 
Speed range 1 Speed range 2 Speed range 1 Speed range 2 




1.24 (2.46)  7.55 (6.5)  1.41 (1.67)  1.91 (2.18)  
SP) attributes      
Mean   -0.17 (-1.96)  -0.17 (-1.96) -0.48 (-1.80)  -0.48 (-1.80)   
SD  0.15 (1.82) 0.15 (1.82) 1.19 (5.20)  1.19 (5.20)   
with recent speeding ticket  IS IS  -0.17 (-2.17) -0.17 (-2.17) 
) 
Mean  Dropped Dropped -0.11 (-1.76)  -0.11 (-1.76) 
SD  -  -  0.14 (2.13)  0.14 (2.13)   
00) x drivers with trip-based salary    IS  IS  -0.13 (-2.43)  -0.13 (-2.43)  
00) x drivers with recent speeding 






Mean   IS  -1.92 (-2.7)  IS  IS  
SD    - 1.33 (2.8)  IS  IS  
Major Increase 
(60/120) 
Mean    IS -2.03 (-3.6)  IS  IS  




50 m      - -   -2.09 (-6.44) -3.91 (-1.72)  
150 m      - - 2.42 (6.64)  4 (1.96)  
200 m      - -  2.31 (6.5)  9.2 (4.6)  
l and perception characteristics   
ge 46-55 
Older drivers (> 
55 years) 
     IS IS  -0.70 (-2.13) IS  
Young drivers 
(<45 years) 
     IS IS  IS 3.75 (2.1)  
dary and 
Up to primary 
level 
    1.81 (2.99)  IS  IS  IS  
rried) 
Married      -0.45 (-2.56) -2.59 (-2.68)  IS  IS  




    IS  IS  IS  IS  
More than 20K     IS  IS  1.78 (2.49)  7.86 (1.94)  
s) 
Trip-based     1.37 (2.07) 10.32 (5.90)  IS  IS  
Monthly      IS IS  IS  IS  
s 
More than 9 
hours 
    IS -2.41 (-1.91)  -1.16 (-1.98) -11.36 (-2.4)  
Less than 8 
hours 
    IS IS  0.57 (2.71)  2.45 (2.32)  
Green minibus     5.19 (5.77) IS -2.71 (-2.6) IS 
Goods vehicle     7.30 (7.87) 5.02 (2.35) -3.06 (-3.4) -3.31 (-2.58) 
Red minibus 
and Taxi 
    5.77 (4.41) IS -2.23 (-1.95) IS 
recently received speeding 
    7.16 (2.93) 10.74 (3.35) IS -5.02 (2.16) 
ding as a 
al and 
Low     IS 6.00 (2.84) IS IS 
ctiveness 
          
and 




High (>7 times 
per 10 trips) 
    IS -3.61 (-3.25) IS -7.15 (-1.95) 
sures:   
3208 
rs 56 
nstants only model -2911.09 
nvergence -1279.21 
n Criterion 3010.53 
mpliance; IS: Statistically Insignificant at 90% confidence level. 
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Table 5 Marginal effects due to changes in the SP attributes 
Variables   
Percentage change in market shares 














Market share in base 
case 
16.96% 78.64% 4.40% 66.27% 32.88% 0.85% 
Change in market share 
upon increment by 1 
point 
4.22% -0.64% -4.85% 4.63% -9.01% -12.74% 
Fines 
Market share in base 
case 
16.96% 78.64% 4.40% 66.27% 32.88% 0.85% 
Change in market share 
upon increment by 10 
percent 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.73% -3.16% -13.02% 
Camera-to-
Housing ratio  
(Base case: 
20/120) 
Market share in base 
case 
16.89% 77.78% 5.34% 66.20% 32.80% 1.00% 
Change in market share 
upon change from base 
case to minor increase 
(40/120) 
0.83% 2.11% -33.39% 0.20% 0.50% -29.52% 
Change in market share 
upon change from base 
case to minor increase 
(60/120) 




housing unit  
(base case: 
100m) 
Market share in base 
case 
18.01% 80.91% 1.08% 73.50% 26.41% 0.09% 
Change in market share 
upon change from base 
case to 50m 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 14.18% -34.37% -50.09% 
Change in market share 
upon change from base 
case to 150m 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -23.02% 63.56% 143.85%
Change in market share 
upon change from base 
case to 200m 








If you are at the Standard section, at which speed range would you travel? (choose one option 
from below) 
 < 50 km/h     51-65 km/h     66-80 km/h     
If you are at the Warning Section, at which speed range would you travel? (choose one option 
from below) 
 < 50 km/h     51-65 km/h     66-80 km/h     
If you are at the Camera Housing Section, at which speed range would you travel? (choose 
one option from below) 
 < 50 km/h     51-65 km/h     66-80 km/h    
Background information  
Speed（km/h） 
< 50 51 - 65 66 - 80 




0 0 3 
0 HK$ 320  HK$ 450  
Camera-to-Housing ratio 20 cameras in 240 housing units  
Location of the warning sign  Warning sign placed 50 meters ahead of housing unit 
Figure 1 Illustration of the location type and a hypothetical scenario for the Stated 
Preference game 
